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JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012). Pp. 400. Hardcover $114.00. 
 
KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012). Pp. 
352. Hardcover $85.00. 
 
In these two remarkable books, Judging Social Rights by Jeff King,1 and 
Constituting Economic and Social Rights by Katharine G. Young,2 we are presented with 
new perspectives for analyzing the relationship between social rights and 
constitutionalism. Both authors argue that it is important to constitutionalize these rights, 
and they then engage in sophisticated analyses about how to implement these rights in 
the context of a complex set of government and nongovernment institutions, practices 
and actors, all within the context of comparative and global frames.  
Yet while there is considerable agreement connecting these two books, they also 
exemplify a disciplinary disconnect between the fields of constitutional and social 
science in the context of welfare state scholarship. Most researchers in each discipline 
conceptualize public social provision to be a constitutive component of democracy, and 
in each there is a vast literature that seeks to explain the origins of the welfare state and 
the mechanisms that hinder or promote a robust public sector. However, despite common 
goals, as will be evident in this essay, the models and explanations employed by each 
discipline rely on orthogonal sets of variables, problems, and methodologies. In addition 
to reading these two very important books, therefore, this essay invites readers also to 
turn their attention to the social science literature for comparative perspectives defined 
by more than cross-national orientations. 
I. JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS 
In Judging Social Rights, Jeff King argues that it is important for countries to 
constitutionalize social rights; that is the beginning, obviously, not the end of what 
matters. He focuses instead on the importance of the role of courts in conjunction with 
other government institutions. In particular, he develops a theory of judicial restraint 
structured around four principles: democratic legitimacy, polycentricity, expertise, and 
                                                            
 * Professor, Department of Political Science, Northeastern University.   
 1.  JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012). 
 2.  KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012). 
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flexibility.3 When these principles are taken together, he argues that they allow for 
judicial restraint based on an incremental approach to adjudication.4 He argues that what 
best promotes the implementation of social rights are courts that proceed slowly rather 
than quickly when addressing social rights policies.5 In so doing, King makes a 
distinction between social and economic rights and policies. 
King accepts the claims that social rights are human rights, and begins his analysis 
from that standpoint.6 That is, he endorses the view that social rights inclusive of 
housing, education, health care, and social security should be included in constitutions, 
but that judges should be given broad powers to interpret and to enforce these rights, 
including striking down legislation.7 He argues that there is a theory of judging that must 
be used as a foundation for discussing how social and economic rights can be 
implemented.8 It is this theory of judging that is important so that constitutional rights 
are a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for implementing social and economic 
rights. What is also necessary is a theory of judging. One of King’s main contributions, 
therefore, is pointing out that we need to look at different mechanisms for implementing 
social rights as entitlements than perhaps we do for other types of rights.9 
King notes that although courts have not always been successful in guaranteeing 
social and economic rights, the judicial system nevertheless should remain a focus of 
analysis.10 Courts, for example, focus on issues, which compels the state to address 
rather than to ignore social and economic rights. Courts also engage in principled 
reasoning, so that interpretations of standards and arguments for the resolution of conflict 
have to be explicit. Courts also have constitutional authority, and this can produce 
jurisdiction over executive and legislative action in terms of remedial flexibility when it 
comes to deciding the outcome of conflicts. In addition, courts are, relatively speaking, 
independent and impartial compared to other branches of government that are more 
grounded on partisan and political interests. Courts also are an arena that, relatively 
speaking, has procedural fairness as a norm, regardless of the substance of what is 
decided. Courts, therefore, can promote participation for claimants by providing an arena 
where various sides of an issue can be heard in public, thereby giving some attention to a 
variety of perspectives. Courts also can, according to King, play an expressive, even 
educative role, by bringing out into the open major policy questions.11 Courts as the site 
of constitutional litigation, therefore, publicize social rights controversies in a way that 
can provide salience to the issues. And, finally, courts promote inter-institutional 
collaboration in the context of rights discourse and deliberation. For these reasons, King 
believes that courts can be an arena not only of implementation of social and economic 
rights, but actually social change for increasing the application of those rights in a 
political system.12 
                                                            
 3.  See KING, supra note 1, at 119-286. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6. See id. at 20-41. 
 7.  See id. at 59-96. 
 8.  See id. 
 9.  See id. at 17-58. 
 10.  Id. at 59-60.  
 11.  Id. at 60-63. 
 12.  Id. at 63-85.  
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The question, of course, for King, is how do courts make use of their authority and 
jurisdiction? He argues that what is most important is that constitutionalized social and 
economic rights have to be interpreted. And they have to be interpreted as based on an 
incrementalist principle.13 He defines a right to social and economic benefits as starting 
with the agreement that everyone has a right to adequate social and economic 
provision.14 And the second principle is that everyone agrees that the state shall take 
reasonable measures with available resources to implement that right. Thus, King makes 
a distinction between the scope of the interest or the right and the nature of the obligation 
of the state in respect to promoting that right.15 In addition, he draws attention to the 
difference between absolute obligation on the part of the state and qualified obligations, 
where the latter means that people have a right to health care, for example, as national 
laws and practices establish that right.16 King’s conclusion is that it is not the scope of 
social rights that most fundamentally concerns judges, but rather the implementation of 
qualified obligations on the part of the state to provide benefits to people.17 
When addressing the distinction between principles and policies, King draws upon 
Ronald Dworkin’s definition of a policy as a kind of standard that “sets out a goal to be 
reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political or social feature of the 
community.”18 By contrast, “[A] ‘principle’ [is] a standard that is to be observed, not 
because it will advance . . . an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, 
but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of 
morality.”19 King, however, focuses more on justices’ abilities, employing a concept he 
refers to a judicial restraint. He sees the use of judicial restraint as a crucial institutional 
mechanism for problem solving, to be used in conjunction with other institutions.20 
Thus, King defines democracy as a form of government in which there must be a 
respect for basic social rights, and that political equality must be what legitimizes 
democracy.21 He argues, therefore, that legislation must be adopted in a democracy that 
manifests the background, political cognitions, and entitlement to political equality in 
relation to social rights, and that legislatures must be given strong decision-making 
authority.22 That assumes, of course, that there has been a legislative focus on rights 
issues and that the relationship of the legislation to politically marginalized groups also 
must be considered. He also argues “that constitutional judicial review can provide a 
workable and proportionate response” to those problems related to the implementation of 
social rights, particularly if judicial review is necessary to secure the needs of marginal 
groups.23 
King also argues that a strong welfare state necessarily includes the regulation of 
                                                            
 13.  See id. at 289-325. 
 14.  Id. at 98. 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. at 103. 
 17.  Id. at 117-18. 
 18.  Id. at 125 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1978)). 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id. at 150-51. 
 21.  Id. at 152. 
 22.  Id. at 153. 
 23.  Id. 
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commerce and redistributive tax and spending policies.24 However, this view of the 
welfare state is sure to be viewed as diametrically opposed to the goals of some, such as 
the wealthy, and, therefore, it will be targeted by lobbying interests. Thus, although 
redistribution is a crucial premise of the welfare state, it is not a premise that all members 
of society endorse, thereby complicating legislative democratic processes oriented 
toward meeting the needs of marginal groups. Too often, for example, groups that are in 
need can be rhetorically dismissed as “welfare queens.”25 
To solve the dilemmas posed by implementing social and economic rights, King 
focuses on policentricity, which is defined by issues involving a large number of 
interlocking and interacting interests and considerations.26 King believes that 
polycentricity is a property of legal issues, but it is not a property of decision-making 
itself.27 He argues that courts can deal with polycentricity very well, particularly when 
considering a range of attenuating factors, such as “judicial mandate, degree of 
polycentricity, access to information, comparative judicial competency, and the nature of 
the remedy.”28 He explores all of these attenuating factors and then evaluates the proper 
role of polycentricity in the way courts adjudicate social rights. King’s major conclusion 
is that polycentricity is often accepted in adjudication and can be managed.29 
King also focuses on the importance of administrative expertise, noting that there 
must be a trade-off between expertise and accountability, the types of expertise when 
evaluating the role of courts and public law, and how there can be failures of expertise 
and what to do about that.30 He argues that there has been historical development in the 
idea of expertise in conjunction with public law and administration, and that it is 
important to use accountability as a principle to evaluate claims of expertise. When this 
is done, expertise can be an important dimension for evaluating how courts promote 
social and economic rights.31 
Another principle that King develops is flexibility. He argues that “judges ought to 
give prominent consideration to the idea of administrative and legislative flexibility in 
their adjudication of constitutional social rights.”32 He analyzes a wide range of types of 
flexibility, such as legal, bureaucratic, and political forms as well as how they are 
connected to procedural rights. He argues that flexible remedies are important because in 
a complex welfare state, there needs to be a way to provide discretion and to strike a 
balance between courts that intervene and courts that are prudent.33 Thus, he argues that 
flexibility is one way to achieve that balance. 
The general theme of King’s enterprise, therefore, is incrementalism. He argues 
that “[j]udicial incrementalism is an appropriate response to two different demands.”34 
One demand, which is practical and managerial, requires courts to deal with complex 
                                                            
 24.  Id. at 157. 
 25.  Id. at 167. 
 26.  Id. at 190. 
 27.  Id. at 189. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 210. 
 30.  Id. at 211-12. 
 31.   See id. at 229-49. 
 32.  Id. at 250. 
 33.  See id. at 251-86. 
 34.  Id. at 289. 
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data and should “be dealt with in a fragmented rather than holistic way.”35 In addition, he 
argues that courts should not intentionally nor accidentally  act to oppose social rights 
that have been initiated by other components of the government.36 King discusses the 
relationship between incrementalism and public administration, drawing upon Charles 
Lindblom, who defined it as “The Science of Muddling Through.”37 King sees 
incrementalism as “not necessarily an inert strategy,” but rather as a “dynamic and 
searching” strategy that includes particularization, that is, the familiar tactic of using 
narrow grounds to decide cases; being cautious about expanding analogies in relation to 
cases; being cautious about using vague legal standards; and being cognizant of the 
procedural rights when making decisions.38 King connects incrementalism to Sunstein’s 
judicial minimalism, as well as to democratic experimentalism as argued by Michael 
Dorf and Charles Sabel.39 He sees incrementalism as an important way to control the 
expansion of positive obligations, which will then enhance the sustainability of those 
social and economic rights that are already secured.40 
In sum, therefore, King has three major contentions. First, social and economic 
rights need to be constitutionalized because they are similar to and as important as civil 
and political rights. Second, there needs to be a theory of restraint on the part of courts 
when dealing with the adjudication of social and economic rights. And, third, the way to 
achieve that restraint is through procedures that are based on incrementalism rather than 
judicial activism. 
II. CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
In Constituting Economic and Social Rights, Katharine G. Young also presents a 
very powerful set of perspectives that give us new ways to think about the welfare state. 
At the very beginning of her book, Young agrees with King that social and economic 
rights are as fundamental as are civil and political rights.41 She discounts, therefore, the 
typology of rights that would cast the former as positive and the latter as negative 
rights.42 She argues instead that “[l]iberal markets and liberal democracies now coexist 
with economic and social rights.”43 She is interested in how the new formulation of 
economic and social rights has evolved and its origins, and she looks to comparative and 
international law to understand how economic and social rights have come to be viewed 
by many—perhaps most—as equivalent to civil and political rights.44 She defines rights 
as “a focal point of interpretative disagreement and agreement, of agitation and 
contestation, and of monitoring and enforcement, of the fundamental material interests 
that are reasonably argued to be universal and compelling.”45 She argues, therefore, that 
                                                            
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 289. 
 37.  Id. at 290 (citing Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 
(1959)). 
 38.  Id. at 293. 
 39.  Id. at 306-07. 
 40.  See id. at 315-20. 
 41.  YOUNG, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
 42.  Id. at 1, 74. 
 43.  Id. at 1. 
 44.  See generally id. 
 45.  Id. at 2. 
5
McDonagh: Economics and Social Rights: A Case of Disciplinary Disconnect
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
532	   TULSA	  LAW	  REVIEW	   [Vol.	  49:527	  
rights are both normative and practical in terms of how they are to be implemented, 
thereby combining rather than dividing normative inquiry and empirical evidence in 
relation to rights.46 Young sees rights as “pronouncements in social ethics, sustainable by 
open public reasoning.”47 She also views rights as pronouncements in law.48 
Young argues that all rights require “positive action” on the part of the state “for 
their enjoyment, as well as significant expenditures.”49 Therefore, she rejects the idea 
that economic and social rights are different in kind from civil and political rights as they 
would have been historically established in foundational, primarily Western legal 
documents, such as the Magna Carta.50 Instead she focuses on economic and social rights 
as being as fundamental and as crucial to constitutional democracy as any other rights 
are.51 Thus, in her analysis, all rights – civil, political, economic, and social – are positive 
rights because governments are implicated in all of them at every step. 
Young makes a very important claim that social and economic rights might be held 
by individuals but that they must be implemented and demanded through collective 
action.52 Thus, it is collectivities that must shape how economic and social rights are 
implemented through the relevant range of institutions. This raises the question of how 
organizations, social movements, and associations are also important to the process of 
implementing social and economic rights. 
She sets out to evaluate the way institutions conceptualize constitutional rights, 
using comparative law. She argues that rights must be considered as process-driven and 
as value-based conceptions that are relevant to many categories of analysis.53 She 
considers the right to education and other rights that refer to baseline material security, 
such as the right to housing and food, as being perhaps equally important to the right to 
vote.54 Her fundamental claim, therefore, is “that a constitutional legal framework 
protective of rights to food, water, health care, housing, and education is one which 
establishes processes of value-based, deliberative problem-solving, rather than one which 
sets out the minimum bundles of commodities or entitlements.”55  
Young has a very interesting historical perspective that examines how social and 
economic rights—such as education, work, and health care—came to be viewed as 
fundamental rights. She talks about interpretative standpoints that argue that basic needs 
as human dignity are part of what constitutes human rights, and then she illustrates the 
“minimalist pressures” on the interpretation of rights by looking at “the doctrinal setting 
of minimum core characteristics . . . that are internal to rights.”56 She also explores the 
ways rights are limited, sometimes “through doctrinal escape clauses, amendment 
provisions, default decision rules, or through the form of quasi-utilitarian reasoning 
                                                            
 46.  Id. 
 47. Id. (citing Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (2004)). 
 48. Id. at 3. 
 49.  Id. at 5. 
 50.  Id.  
 51. Id. at 5-6. 
 52.  Id. at 13. 
 53.  Id. at 2-6. 
 54.  Id. at 4. 
 55.  Id. at 6. 
 56.  Id. at 30. 
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known as balancing.”57 Young argues that all of these ways are important for interpreting 
how social and economic rights will be implemented and for understanding what the 
pressures are that go into the processes related to fulfilling economic and social rights.58  
One of Young’s major arguments is that we need to focus on what constitutes 
rights rather than whether they are merely constitutionalized.59 In her view, to constitute 
means “to socially institute, so that the commitments are committed to social 
understanding, and are realized effectively in law.”60 Although the text is important, she 
focuses on the post-interpretative framework in which other processes in addition to the 
text are also important. In order for economic and social rights to be constituted within 
social institutions, she argues that they must be “grounded on the layered sands of what 
is right according to reason, what is right according to decision-making authority, and 
what is right is according to experienced social fact.”61 That is, reason, authority, and 
social fact are the keys to constituting economic and social process. In the process that is 
necessary for the articulation of social and economic rights, there may be shifting 
emphases on each of the three. 
Young equates reason with the philosophy of justice; she equates what is right 
according to decision-making authority to the question of positive law; and she equates 
what is right according to social facts to the process that links constituting economic and 
social rights with actually existing social understanding, that is, what the people who are 
governed by the law actually believe to be accepted by the law.62 She argues, therefore, 
that there are a “multiplicity of foundations” for constituting social and economic rights 
and that there must be adjudication to implement social and economic rights.63 However, 
the latter must be done in conjunction with the executive and legislative branches of 
government. Thus, the state institutions—courts, legislative, and executive branches—
must work together rather than only seeking solutions to the implementation of social 
and economic rights in courts.64 Thus, Young establishes that there will be collective 
locations of authorship that articulate the rights in terms of social movements and other 
forms of association. In particular, she uses South Africa as a way to provide examples 
and answers that will address these perspectives that she established.65 In addition, 
Young is interested in global issues, transformative globalism, as she puts it.66 In that 
sense, she challenges the use of the nation-state alone as the context for examining social 
and economic rights. This is an important and topical perspective that expands the way 
we think about how social and economic rights are both established and implemented. 
When looking at interpretative theories that define the meaning of economic and 
social rights, Young introduces two very important principles: rationalism and 
consensualism.67 She associates rationalism with not only the fundamental rights of 
                                                            
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 30-31. 
 59.  Id. at 6. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 7. 
 62.  Id. at 7-9. 
 63.  Id. at 10. 
 64.  Id. at 13. 
 65.  Id. at 15-25. 
 66.  Id. at 22-25. 
 67.  Id. at 33-34. 
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human dignity, but also just plain human survival.68 Consensualism, on the other hand, is 
what is agreed to by the majority of states or constituents, and it can also serve as 
providing a meaning for both the rights and the legal and social institutions that are 
assigned the job of implementing those rights.69 Young’s view, however, is that these 
two interpretative standpoints share a common ground rather than constituting two polar 
extremes on a continuum.70 
Young places great emphasis on establishing what constitutes the minimum core 
for economic and social rights that would be compatible with ethical pluralism, noting 
that this enterprise entails serious problems.71 She argues, however, that it is important to 
give legal bite to the standard of obligations established by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), and that there is an obligation to 
realize progressively economic and social rights.72  Young addresses the difficult 
problem, of course, about how to measure the minimum core, and she also discusses how 
one interprets  limits in terms of the application of economic and social rights. However, 
she finds that the idea of the minimum core, however many objections there might be, 
nevertheless is a way to advance a base line of social and economic protection across 
varied economic policies and vastly different levels of available resources.73 
Young also addresses the issue of global redistributive lines, arguing that states 
that are in a position to protect minimum core benefits are liable if they do not do so.74 
Thus, she points to an “obligation to provide ‘international assistance and 
cooperation.’”75 In so doing, she links core benefits to justiciability, thereby connecting 
justiciability with a substantive minimum.76 In particular, she underscores justiciability, 
arguing that the idea of the minimum core provides a guide for economic and social 
rights in the context of judicial review.77 As a result, there is more predictability in terms 
of the application of principles for implementing social and economic rights. 
Young recognizes that there can be reasonable limits to social and economic rights, 
or even suspension of them, and she focuses on the justification for limits.78 A legitimate 
limitation occurs when there is a proper justification for the abridgment of the right, 
perhaps because of balancing competing claims or conflicting rights or conflicting 
interests or some assessment of proportionality of modes for implementation.  She 
contributes a very important and lucid discussion of what makes limitations reasonable, 
arguing that justificatory tests of reasonableness can sometimes avoid the risk of over- or 
under- inclusivity in defining economic and social rights.79 The key to this doctrinal 
test—reasonableness—is the ability to assess the nature of the duty within the context of 
                                                            
 68.  Id. at 33. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 33-34, 65. 
 71.  Id. at 66. 
 72.  Id. at 67-68 (citing International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “ICESCR”]). 
 73.  Id. at 72. 
 74.  Id. at 73. 
 75.  Id. (citing ICESCR, supra note 72, at art. 2(I)). 
 76.  Id. at 77-78. 
 77.  Id. at 77-79. 
 78.  See id. at 99-129. 
 79.  Id. at 126-29. 
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social and economic rights, including the range of factors that are relevant to the 
performance of the duty. 
Young also addresses the issue of enforcing economic and social rights, which, of 
course, is central to their legal significance. Here she invokes a typology of judicial 
review in which the question of judiciability involves two opposite extremes: “judicial 
usurpation on the one hand, and judicial abdication on the other.”80 She introduces an 
important typology of judicial review, defined by deferential review, conversational 
review, experimentalist review, managerial review, and preemptory review, and she 
explains each in turn with examples from court cases drawn from a variety of political 
systems.81 
Young notes that although different types of judicial review differ in terms of the 
mode of interpretation, scrutiny, and the remedy the courts deploy, they nevertheless are 
replicated to some degree in comparative constitutional law.82  Thus, she develops the 
idea of the catalytic court, which is a court that is in a “productive interaction with other 
political and legal actors.”83 This metaphor suggests energy and change as triggered by 
the court system. She particularly examines the idea of the catalytic court in the context 
of South Africa.84 
In addition, Young develops a typology of courts that includes engaged courts, 
supremacist courts, and detached courts. Using the idea of the catalytic court, she then 
connects this typology to that of judicial review, noting that an engaged court might be 
more connected to conversational judicial review and experimentalist review; a 
supremacist court would be more connected to managerial judicial review and 
preemptory review; and a detached court would be more connected to deferential judicial 
review and conversational judicial review.85 Thus, Young integrates three major ideas: 
the catalytic court, five different types of judicial review, and three different types of 
courts. Her example of a supremacist court is drawn from Columbia, an example of an 
engaged court is India, and her example of a detached court is the United Kingdom.86 
Young also analyzes the idea that rights are constituted by means of contestation. 
Therefore, she argues that it is important to understand how courts are linked not only 
with each other but also to the market and civil society.87 Here she looks at social 
movements in the context of economic and social rights, such as the right to health in 
Ghana, and she examines how “the development of a constitutional culture can also 
occur within the community at large.”88 Jurigenesis is law creation, and she applies that 
to an understanding of economic and social rights.89 She argues that economic and social 
rights frames can be successful in the context of constitutional law and international 
human rights on the basis of three principles. First, they establish the universalized 
language that differs from a particularistic assertion of the satisfaction of the human 
                                                            
 80.  Id. at 133. 
 81.  Id. at 142-66. 
 82. Id. at 167. 
 83.  Id. at 172. 
 84.  Id. at 174-91. 
 85.  Id. at 193-95. 
 86.  Id. at 196-212. 
 87.  Id. at 221-22. 
 88.  Id. at 233. 
 89.  Id. at 234-38. 
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needs specific to one or another individual or group. This universalism is in a sense post-
national.90 Second, this “frame of economic and social rights establishes a claimant-duty-
holder relationship that is different from the frames provided by other distributive 
contestations,” and, as such, calls “for the satisfaction of ‘basic needs.’”91 Third, “the 
frame of normativity provided by the rights to food, health, housing, or education” 
addresses not only the state, but addresses the law, so they are not extra-legal in that 
sense.92 In addition, Young examines the role of social movements in relation to 
economic and social rights in South Africa, showing that “[e]conomic and social rights 
offers a powerful discourse for social movements.”93 
Young develops the idea of new governance, which goes beyond constitutionalism 
per se. She defines this as the act of governing, in which non-governmental actors, such 
as the market and civil society, play important roles.94 Thus, she analyzes state, market, 
and civil society coordination in the context of how courts can enforce economic and 
social rights. In so doing, she considers how the market can be an ally, not just an enemy, 
in terms of implementing social and economic rights, and she also argues that this 
principle of new governance requires the continued participation of non-market 
stakeholders, such as social movements.95 Young also develops the idea of an 
experimentalist stake holder, and uses the treatment action campaign as an example, 
which was developed to work with pharmaceutical companies to deal with the issue of 
HIV/AIDS virus.96 She shows how this treatment action campaign both works with 
government and non-government agents, even while retaining its own autonomy, which 
is important for its success.97 
In sum, this book argues that economic and social rights are both human rights and 
constitutional rights, and that the framework of constituting rights argues for the practical 
importance of law, reason, and social fact in making rights a reality.98 Young looks at the 
interpretation, enforcement, and contestation of economic and social rights, drawing 
examples from South Africa, India, Germany, Canada, and the United Nations.99 She 
suggests that economic and social rights, such as the right to food, water, health care, 
education, and housing, provide “an opportunity to change the way we use the legal 
system, in order to unsettle the current experiences of maldistribution and poverty,” and 
she makes the case that implementing these rights “depends upon action in the 
legislatures, the courts, the bureaucracies, the markets, the hospitals, the schools, the 
streets, the Internet, and, most importantly, in our minds.”100 
III. DISCIPLINARY DISCONNECT  
Both authors situate the interpretation and enforcement of social rights within a 
                                                            
 90.  Id. at 243-44. 
 91.  Id. at 244. 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at 255. 
 94.  Id. at 263. 
 95.  Id. at 271-75. 
 96.  See id. at 276-79. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 289. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 299. 
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very large frame of government and non-government institutions and actors, that 
includes constitutions and courts, of course, but also so much more. In addition, both 
books employ a comparative approach in their discussions of what maximizes social 
rights agendas. In the case of Constituting Economic and Social Rights, there is also 
considerable attention directed to how globalization processes modify the dynamics of 
national settings. In the case of both books, there is also a clear commitment to the value 
of social rights as a necessary component of any political system that claims to be a 
democracy. In all of these respects, there is much to recommend both books to the 
community of constitutional law scholars and those who address the relationship 
between constitutions and the implementation of social rights. 
Yet, were one to expand perspectives to include the social science disciplines, 
particularly political science and political economy, it would become evident that both 
books also share limitations. There is a vast social science literature that seeks to answer 
many of the same questions these authors address, such as how to define economic and 
social rights, what are their origins, how are they implemented, and most of this literature 
is comparative in scope. However, it would appear that the social science scholars all but 
talk past constitutional scholars and vice versa. Though immersed with the same 
questions and problems, these book exemplify a disciplinary disconnect between 
constitutionalism, however, broadly conceived, and empirical social science. 
Judging Social Rights, for example, does make one bibliographic reference to The 
Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State,101 a compendium of representative works and 
essays by the leading scholars of the welfare state, but little—or virtually nothing—is 
used in either Judging Social Rights or Constituting Economic and Social Rights that 
reflects the rich scholarship that The Handbook summarizes. Thus, although both 
Judging Social Rights and Constituting Economic and Social Rights focus on social and 
economic rights in the context of democracy, they omit attention to one of the most 
fundamental principles of democratic governance: public opinion. To what degree, for 
example, do public attitudes support the view that the redistribution of economic 
resources by the government—a key to social provision—is an essential characteristic of 
a democracy? In 2005, a World Values Survey asked that question of 71,313 people—far 
fewer people than it should have—if economic and social rights are to be 
implemented.102 On a ten point scale, where ten represents complete agreement that it is 
an essential characteristic of a democracy for the “government to tax the rich and 
subsidize the poor,” and one represents complete disagreement, the average score for the 
United States was only 4.98.103 Clearly, it is more than just the wealthy who account for 
resistance to the redistributive role of the government in relation to social provision. 
Both books invoke social rights in relation to democracy and address how the 
judicial system in concert with other actors, including non-governmental ones, can work 
to find ways to make economic and social rights a reality. However, they omit attention 
to the variables and perspectives social scientists have found to be most salient in those 
                                                            
 101.  KING, supra note 1, at 40 (citing Wil A. Arts & John Gelissen, Models of the Welfare State, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE WELFARE STATE 569 (F. G. Castles et al., eds., 2010) [hereinafter THE 
HANDBOOK]). 
 102.  Variable 152, 2005 SURVEY, available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
 103.  Id.  
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democratic processes.104 Democracy is literally the “rule of the people,” but most 
scholars in the social sciences analyze how the people’s opinions are funneled through 
political parties, interests groups, and social movements in the context of political, 
structural, and fiscal characteristics of a political system.105 While King and especially 
Young invoke some of these variables, neither one explores the labyrinth of left-leaning 
versus right-leaning partisan components of a political system106 as explanations for 
welfare state development nor the intricacies of parliamentary versus presidential 
systems, proportional versus winner-take-all electoral systems,107 the number of parties 
available for channeling public opinion,108 or fiscal institutions that also influence 
taxation and spending as the foundation of the welfare state. Omitted is the vast literature 
on the varieties of capitalism,109 power resource models,110 how wages structure social 
benefits,111 and how gender figures—in both to the analysis of types of welfare states and 
the resulting economic and political impact on women.112 Similarly, neither book 
considers the organization of the working class as measured by union density, for 
example, in relation to welfare spending indices where the latter could be a fruitful way 
to determine if the minimum core is being met.113 
However, if one turns to the social science study of economic and social rights, it 
is precisely such “variables” that explain why the United States lags in establishing 
social provision in contrast to the Scandinavian countries that excel. It is also precisely 
such variables as the political organization of the working class that social science 
scholarship shows to be a powerful corrective to those—often the wealthy—who are not 
initially supportive of the redistributive policies upon which social provision depends.114 
And as social science scholarship has also shown, it is often the coordinated efforts of 
both business and labor, rather than their conflicts or contestation that explain why 
development of a welfare state is successful.115 
To be fair, of course, it is also true that social science empirical work all but 
ignores constitutional issues, including even such tangible data as constitutional texts. 
                                                            
 104.  CHRISTOPHER PIERSON & FRANCIS G. CASTLES, THE WELFARE STATE READER (2d ed. 2006). 
 105.  RESTRUCTURING THE WELFARE STATE: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY CHANGE (Bo Rothstein 
& Sven Steinmo eds., 2002). 
 106.  Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some 
Democracies Redistribute More than Others, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 2 (2006). 
 107.  JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE 
RICH RICHER – AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010). 
 108.  EVELYNE HUBER & JOHN D. STEPHENS, DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE: PARTIES 
AND POLICIES IN GLOBAL MARKETS (2001). 
 109.  DEBATING VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM (Bob Hancke ed., 2009). 
 110.  Walter Korpi, Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship: Social 
Rights during Sickness in Eighteen OECD Countries since 1930, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 309 (1989). 
 111.  TORBEN IVERSEN, CONTESTED ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS: THE POLITICS OF MACROECONOMICS AND 
WAGE BARGAINING IN ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES (1999). 
 112.  Ann Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender 
Relations and Welfare States, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 51 (1993); TORBEN IVERSEN & FRANCES ROSENBLUTH, 
WOMEN, WORK & POLITICS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GENDER INEQUALITY (2010). 
 113.  UNIONS, EMPLOYERS, AND CENTRAL BANKS (Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson & David Soskice eds., 
2000). 
 114.  ALEXANDER M. HICKS, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND WELFARE CAPITALISM: A CENTURY OF INCOME 
SECURITY POLITICS (1999). 
 115.  CATHIE JO MARTIN & DUANE SWANK, THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF BUSINESS INTERESTS: 
COORDINATION, GROWTH, AND EQUALITY (2012). 
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The Comparative Constitutions Project has now completed the coding of all of the 
world’s constitutions on hundreds of variables, but even this empirical source of rich 
information has yet to be integrated into most studies of the welfare state by political 
scientists or political economists.116 The term, “constitution,” for example, is absent from 
the Index of The Handbook. If and when the constitution of a country is included in 
empirical studies of the welfare state, most likely that will be in the context of how a 
constitution structures the branches of government and/or federalism as a principle of 
governance, rather than whether or how a country’s constitution guarantees social 
provision. 
Raising these observations is not so much a criticism as it is a comment on how 
different disciplines approach the question of the welfare state from such disparate 
perspectives, even while agreeing on the importance of social and economic provision as 
an essential component of a democracy. King and Young present fascinating insights and 
arguments as built upon innovative and explanatory typologies, but by social science 
standards, they do not test their arguments. There is no attempt to code the countries 
systematically on a set of characteristics as a foundation for analyzing statistically 
whether the connections asserted between those characteristics actually hold up. Rather, 
examples are provided from selected countries to illustrate, rather than to test, 
connections between principles or characteristics. Furthermore, we do not know from 
either book what the connection might be between public opinion about whether welfare 
rights are an essential characteristic of democracy, welfare spending, and political 
participation. Yet according to the theory of economic and social rights, these rights are 
important in part because social provision promotes greater political inclusion, including 
greater political participation. 
For those who seek to expand the discussion and analysis of economic and social 
rights to encompass purviews beyond the court system itself much less merely 
constitutionalized text, these books are extremely valuable. However, for those who 
would seek to integrate welfare state scholarship from the perspectives of constitutional 
law and empirical social science, there is a very long way to go.	  
                                                            
 116.  COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://www.comparativeconstitutonsproject.org (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2013). 
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